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Abstract 
 
A spectacular rearrangement of firm boundaries took place in post-socialist countries in the 
early 1990s, a period during which the socialist enterprise structure dismantled in a 
relatively short time.  This paper investigates the boundary changes of companies in four 
countries: the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, and Romania.  A database of 336 
companies from the four countries including data for ten years (1989 – 1998) serves as a 
basis for the analysis.  The split-ups in the sample data are analyzed separately according 
to whether the structural change happened before or after privatization, as the underlying 
motivations might have been different depending on whether the company was controlled 
by managers appointed by the state, with associated ambiguous incentives and uncertain 
career prospects, as opposed to private owners with clearly defined property rights.   
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Összefoglalás 
 
Az 1990-es évek elején viszonylag rövid idő alatt végbement a centralizált szocialista 
vállalati struktúra szétbomlása, és látványosan átrendeződtek a vállalatok határai. A 
vállalatok működési kereteinek módosulása természetes és szükséges folyamat volt, hiszen 
a bürökratikus tervgazdasági irányítás céljait szolgáló, összevont vállalati szerkezetben 
működő cégek a piaci koordináció megjelenésével újra kellett, hogy gondolják 
működésüket, belső szerkezetüket és külső kapcsolatrendszerüket. Ez a folyamat azonban 
igen sajátos körülmények között zajlott le, egy kiszámíthatónak és tisztán piacinak nem 
nevezhető, bizonytalan környezetben. Felvetődik a kérdés, hogy milyen erők határozhatták 
meg, mely szervezeti egységek váltak külön, fel lehet –e fedezni valamilyen 
törvényszerűséget a vállalatok határainak átrendeződésével kapcsolatban? A tanulmány 
egy 330 elemből álló, cseh, szlovák, magyar és román vállalatokból álló minta adatai 
alapján próbál a kérdésre választ keresni. 
 
Kulcsszavak: vállalati határok, szétválás, szerkezetátalakítás, gazdasági átmenet  
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Introduction 
The predominant pattern of industrial organization during the period of central 
planning, or state socialism, was concentrated production in large entities, known as state 
enterprises.  The rationale was both to exploit economics of scale and to improve 
bureaucratic coordination, by minimizing the transaction costs related to central planning 
(Swaan, 1994).  It is the evaluation of most observers that this process resulted in an over-
centralized company structure, at least from the point of view of the market economy.  The 
disintegration of firms formerly forced to merge as a result of central planning would then 
seem to be a natural adjustment process of enterprises placed under some efficiency 
constraints, as business relationships formed through central planning are not likely to be 
the best alternatives in a market environment.  
Regarding boundary changes that happened simultaneously with firm restructuring 
in the beginning of the 1990s the following questions arise: What were the driving forces 
behind the split-ups?  What factors determined which units or plants became independent?  
What were the consequences of the split-ups for subsequent firm performance?  We 
examine these questions similarly to Lizal, Singer and Svejnar (1994), who try to explain 
these spontaneous boundary changes in a bargaining framework.  We suppose, moreover, 
that split-ups and mergers before privatization may have been motivated by the possibility 
for managers to take control of the more valuable assets in their enterprise, rather than 
being value-enhancing overall.  After privatization, the split-ups may be more likely to be 
the result of decisions made on the basis of efficiency considerations.  Therefore a key 
hypothesis is that boundary changes may not improve performance before the firm is 
privatized, while they may do afterwards. 
The structure of the paper is the following:  The first section examines standard 
theories of the limits of firm boundaries, and assesses how much and in which ways these 
theories can contribute to the understanding of post-socialist boundary changes.  The 
following section describes the data and variables used in the analysis.  In the next part of 
the paper the hypotheses relevant for an empirical examination of firm boundaries in 
transition are sketched out. The fourth section includes some initial empirical results.  
 
1.  Theoretical Approaches to Changes in Boundaries  
Economic literature provides a variety of approaches attempting to explain the 
forces that determine organizational boundaries.  The question of how much activity 
should be carried out within an organization under hierarchical coordination, as opposed to 
the purchase of goods from outside the firm, reaches back to Coase’s article on “The 
Nature of the Firm” (Coase, 1937).  The school of New Institutional Economics can be 
traced back to his observations, as well as to the book “Modern Corporation and Private 
Property” published in 1932 by Berle and Means, which points to agency problems in 
firms where ownership and control are separated.  The three main branches distinguished 
within the school of new institutional economics (Kieser, 1995): the theory of property 
rights developed by Grossman, Hart and Moore (1986, 1990) (Kieser, 1995), the agency 
theory originating in the above mentioned book of Berle and Means, and the theory of 
transaction costs worked out by Williamson (1975, 1985) might all have some relevance to   4
examining structural changes in post-socialist countries, although their underlying 
assumptions hardly apply to firms in the period of restructuring. 
Holmström and Roberts draw attention to the role of organizational knowledge in 
relation to the boundaries of firms, which seem to have a definite role in the large number 
of mergers taking place in today’s globalized economy (Holmström, Roberts, 1998).  This 
approach builds on the ideas of evolutionary theory, which refers to the common 
knowledge possessed by a firm as its competence, having the same role in „retention” of 
characteristics as genes do in biology.  (Alrdrich/McCalvey call this set of mostly tacit 
knowledge as „comppool” to the analogy of „genepool” (Kieser, 1995)).  Studies 
attempting to establish links between business strategy and economic theory use the 
concept of „corporate coherence” (Teece et al., 1994 in Foss, Christensen, 1996).   
The role of common knowledge is difficult to be incorporated in the analysis of 
firm boundaries at the beginning of transition, as its cohesive force was mangled due to a 
number of different factors.  Technologies and related skills became obsolete in most of 
the firms by the beginning of the 1990s, the cease of COMECON resulted in the break-up 
of much of the earlier international commercial relations, necessary layoffs of excess labor 
force damaged the common pool of knowledge, while the rationalization of production 
brought along necessary changes in the product structure, requiring the introduction of new 
skills and technologies.  Although personal connections played an important role in 
retaining and rebuilding economic relationships, this type of “knowledge“ usually reached 
beyond the boundaries of the existing companies (Swaan, 1994, Vedres, 1998).  
As regards transaction cost theory, one has to remember that restructuring was to 
be performed in a rather chaotic environment, where companies did not have the cognition 
of market transactions, the institutional environment was only partially developed, and new 
contracting relations were immature (Swaan, 1994).  It is, however, important to find out, 
whether transaction costs are relevant in analyzing structural changes after privatization, in 
firms held by private owners.  
Privatization and the evolution of property rights must have had a strong affect on 
the disintegration of firms.  It is, however, quite difficult to formulate clear hypotheses for 
the period before privatization, given that property rights were divided in an unclear and 
peculiar way between the state and the management of state companies.  From among the 
four categories of property rights traditionally distinguished in the property rights approach 
(Kieser, 1995, p. 254.) there were almost none possessed exclusively by the governing 
boards of the firms (BKE, 1990). 
Examining the break-ups in a bargaining framework similarly to Lízal et. al (1994) 
appears to be a more relevant approach to the problem.  Many researchers looked at the 
conflict of managers and the state in the course of restructuring and privatization in a 
principal-agent context.
2  However, in addition to the state - management conflict, one also 
has to look at the bargaining process between the managers of central units and managers 
of divisions over company assets, similarly to the bargaining over company resources in 
the theory of internal capital markets, what has an extensive, mainly empirical literature in 
developed countries (Bolton, Scharfstein, 1998).   
The availability of empirical research results related to organizational changes in 
transitional countries is quite limited.  Zemplinerová and Stíbal (1994) looked at effects of 
company break-ups to the structure of industry in the Czech Republic.  Lízal, Singer and 
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Svejnar (1994) worked out a game theoretic model on the behavior of managers of 
enterprise units, and tested their hypotheses on Czech manufacturing firms breaking up in 
years 1991-1992.   
 
2.  Data and Variables Used in the Analysis 
The data used for the analysis was collected by the Labor Project of the Central 
European University in two waves, in years 1995 and 1998. The time period of the data 
embraces the 1989 – 1998 period, and includes a large number of variables on each 
important aspect of company restructuring, among which we have interesting information 
related to the changes in firm boundaries. Data were provided by 336 firms in 4 countries: 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. The distribution of firms by branch 
can be seen in Table 1, which reveals that most of the firms analyzed belong to the 
manufacturing sector in all countries, except Romania, where more than half of the firms 
operate in the construction and services.  
In order to trace back the changes in firm boundaries and capture the magnitude of 
changes in establishments, the questionnaire asked for information on the employment and 
establishments for what we defined as the “legal entity”, and what referred to the company 
that included the establishments of the analyzed firm in the actual year. This means that in 
the beginning of the period this might be different from the legal entity of the firm 
interviewed, in case it split from its legal predecessor, or a new company was formed 
through a merger.  According to Table 2, the number of employees in legal entity fell 
dramatically between years 1989-1998. One has to keep in mind that this huge negative 
change reflects changes due to both employment loss and spin-offs. The average and 
median values decreased  to less than a third of the 1989 value in all countries,  the largest 
drop is observable in the Czech and Slovak Republics.  
The numbers in Table 3 differ from those included in the previous table in that they 
relate to the set of establishments we defined as the “current firm”. This relates to the 
premises that the interviewed firm consisted of in each year back to 1989, meaning that in 
the beginning of the period it could belong to a different legal entity, its legal predecessor. 
Again, we can observe an almost monotonic fall in the number of employees in the whole 
time period, especially when we look at the medians.  
Table 4 provides statistics for the number of establishments in the legal entities. 
Except for Romania (for which we miss data for most years in the first period), a 
spectacular change is observable in the boundaries of the firms of the analysed companies. 
The average number of establishments decreased from 6.4 to 2.0 in the Czech and Slovak 
Republics and from 5.4 to 3.6 in Hungary. The descriptives for Romanian firms do not 
reflect any notable change, although from the results showed in Table 6.a we will see that 
numerous splitups happened among them. (Note: This fact of course questions the validity 
of these data.) 
Table 5 shows the number of employees per establishment - again a monotonic 
decrease - suggesting that the drastic change we observed in the level of employment of 
the legal entity is due not only to spin offs, but also to a substantial fall in the employment 
levels at the different establishments. 
Tables 6.a and 6.b include frequencies for split-ups and mergers for all countries by 
year. Most split-ups happened in the period of 1990 – 1995. Mergers were not frequent in 
the observed period, although a little bit more happened towards the end of the decade in   6
Hungary. The numbers again prove that a substantial disintegration took place among the 
firms in the sample.  
Table 7 shows how the number of privatized firms (defined as having any private 
share) increased during the years. Because in 1995, the year of the first survey, our 
objective was to approach privatized firms, almost all the companies were at least partially 
private by that time.   
 
3.  Hypotheses 
Break-ups of firms in the analyzed countries happened in two distinct waves.   
Firstly, there were some spontaneous or regulated split ups with spontaneous elements in 
each country.  Later, decentralization was usually connected to the privatization process, or 
was a result of the actions of new private owners.  
In the Czech and Slovak Republics, the first splits happened in the early 1990s, as a 
spontaneous activity, that had to be approved by the relevant Ministry, and in which plant 
management played a vital role. This process was stopped by the privatization program, 
which, however, created the opportunity for further split-ups by providing all juridical and 
physical units the legal right to submit competing privatization projects for any part of the 
enterprise. (Charap, Zemplinerova, 1993, p. 3-4.) 
In Hungary, the 33
rd Government Decree Amending the 1977 Enterprise Act, 
parent companies enjoyed complete freedom of action in creating affiliates, although the 
creation of corporations with only Hungarian parties had to be approved by the Council of 
Ministers, and forming joint ventures needed the consent of the Minister of Finance 
(Matolcsy, 1988).  Than, from 1989 the Transformation Act conceptualized the so called 
"right of initiation" that created the possibility for the companies, trusts, or the member 
companies of trusts as well as some economic functional or sector governing institutions to 
initiate the separation of economic units and form a new, separate company. (BKE, 1990). 
In Romania break-ups of companies were first launched on the basis of Law No. 
15/1990 on the Reorganization of State-Owned Enterprises into Commercial Companies or 
regies autonomes. The law placed the right to initiate the incorporation and split-up of 
enterprises in the hand of the state and local governments. In practice, however, often the 
managers or employees requested the separation of their own units and transformed them 
into a joint stock or limited liability company. (Frydman, Rapaczynski, Earle, 1993).  
Whether the spit-ups in our sample happened before or after privatization, can be 
seen in Table 8, according to which out of the 327 total number of splits, 96 happened after 
privatization, and 231 happened before or together with privatization.  Because we assume 
that the nature of the possible motivations behind the boundary changes were different in 
these periods, we are going to analyze the two sub-samples separately. 
The first set of break-ups is to be examined in a bargaining framework, similarly to 
Lízal, Singer and Svejnar (1994).  The difference in our analysis is, that the database used 
includes variables that make it possible to identify the initiators of spin-offs, therefore, a 
relationship between the likely motives and resulting performance change can be tested 
directly.  A first step is to differentiate companies which were former master enterprises 
(M  - master firm) from former sub-units that broke away from a larger enterprise (S - 
subsidiary).  The initiator of the boundary change could be either the manager of the 
master firm, the manager of the subsidiary or the state privatization agency/branch ministry 
(the government).  Table 9. identifies the initiators of the split-ups in the sample, according   7
Was the firm   
formerly a subsidiary 
or a master firm? 
to the former status of the surveyed firm.  It turns out from the last part of the table, that 
out of the 266 firms that went through a boundary change, 203 are parent companies, and 
only 63 are former divisions of larger firms.  The mother company initiated the break up in 
158 cases, the subsidiary wanted to break away from the mother firm in 34 cases, while the 
government forced the firms to split in 74 cases.  
The following diagram depicts the hypothesized outcomes, where the arrows show 
the possible direction of change in performance as a result of the spin-off. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In case the firm in question is a former master company, three outcomes are 
possible according to who initiated the split-up.  If it was the master company itself, the 
break-up should result in an increased performance, as the central unit probably tried to get 
rid of a division that drew back its performance.  In case the split-up was initiated by the 
separated subsidiary, there should be a negative effect on the performance of the master 
company, because the separated unit was most likely a profitable division that aimed to 
keep all its profits, which could be otherwise reallocated by the central management to less 
profitable parts of the enterprise.  The outcome is uncertain when the government initiated 
the split-up, as those split-ups were most probably connected to the sale of assets in a 
privatization program.  A further inclusion of relevant variables is needed to formulate a 
specific hypothesis for this case, but the outcomes might also reveal some common 
patterns.  If the company was a former subsidiary, the same hypotheses should hold, except 
that the signs of the effects are the opposite.  
The database allows us to measure logarithmic change in performance within a two 
years period (between years t-1 and t+1) instead of looking at yearly changes, which is a 
more reasonable indicator for the purpose of the research, given that effects of boundary 
changes on performance are more likely to appear in a longer period of time.  Moreover, it 
is not possible to detect whether the spin-off happened in the beginning or towards the end 
of year t.  
 
 
Subsidiary  Master 
Master firm 
Subsidiary 
Government 
?  ? 
Who initiated 
the break-up? 
Master firm 
Subsidiary 
Government   8
4.  Empirical Analysis – Initial Results  
The empirical analysis starts with an investigation of whether privatization really 
made any difference in the effects of boundary changes on firm performance.  The 
following equation is estimated by OLS: 
 
ln(πt+1/πt-1)= α + β0 *ln(πt-1) + β1i(EMPt) + β2iSPLITED + β3iAFTERPR + 
β4iSPLITED*AFTERPR  + β5iControls, 
 
where 
•  π denotes variables measuring relative performance: real revenues over employment, 
real value added over employment, real profits over employment and over revenues, 
and real investments over employment and revenues, and πt-1 and πt+1  refer to 
performance mesures for the years before and after the structural change happened 
•  EMPt stands for the average employment of the firms in the year of the split-up 
•  SPLITED specifies whether a split-up happened at the firm in year t 
•  DPRIV is a dummy denoting whether the firm is privatized  
•  SPLITED*DPRIV is an interaction term of the two previous variables  
•  Controls mean different dummy variables controlling for branch, country, region and 
year effects. 
 
Results for the first specification with the six dependent variables are reported in 
Table 10.  Privatization has a definite effect on performance change, except when we use 
investments over employment as a measure. Split-ups seem to influence performance 
change in a negative direction  when looking at labor productivity, while the interaction 
effect of splits and privatization does not show that there would be any difference in the 
results of splitups on performance according to whether they happened before or after 
privatization. 
Split-ups that happened before and together with privatization are analyzed using 
the sub-sample of the relevant firms.  The sample includes mostly former master firms, 
while the number of former divisions is too small to draw statistically valid conclusions. 
(A significant number of observation was lost as a result of using variables indicating 
efficiency change between years t-1 and t+1).  Therefore, testing the hypotheses related to 
the first period has to be limited to the following OLS model:  
 
ln(πt+1/πt-1) = α + β0*ln(πt-1) + β1i(EMPt) + β2iINIT + β5iControls, 
 
where 
•  INITi are dummy variables denoting the type of initiator 
 
Table 11 summarizes the results according to the six performance measures.  When 
the dependent variable is labor productivity, the dummy variable denoting subsidiaries as 
an initiator for splitting from the master firm cause a negative change in performance.  This 
result supports our initial assumptions.  Using other measures of efficiency, the sign of the 
effect of this dummy is variable, however, and the estimates are not statistically 
significant.   9
As we discussed above, the influence of the state is hard to determine. However, 
the results suggest that splitups initiated by the government to effected the level of 
investments negatively. These two findings are in line with the hypotheses sketched up 
above, although the results do not seem to be underlined by more efficiency measures. 
For the period after privatization, the equation takes the following form: 
 
ln(πt+1/πt-1) = α + β0*ln(πt-1) + β1i(EMPt) + β2iOWN + β3i SPLITED + 
β4iSPLITED*OWN + β5iControls, 
 
where  
•  OWN denotes the largest owner in the company (with a share no fewer than 10 
percent), to test for the possible differences in the effects of boundary changes 
according to ownership types. 
 
Results are presented in Table 12. Although the ownership dummies prove 
privatized firms to perform better than state companies (especially foreign owned 
comanies), results for the interaction terms between splits and ownership types suggest that 
there are no differences between the effects of splitups according to which type of owner 
the companies have.  If we run the same specification to check for the possible effects of 
mergers, we get basically the same, neither the dummy MERGED, nor the interaction 
terms between ownership dummies and MERGED show any statistically significant result. 
According to Eva Voszka (1993), managers of firms during the period of 
spontaneous transformations were often forced to seek compromise with the managers of 
subsidiaries, in order to survive.  She lists a wide range of possible reasons for creating 
separate legal entities using the assets of firms, for example, a debt-equtiy swap could be 
used to convert credits into shares, taking rid of the financial burden paralysing the 
operation of the company, which could result in debt-free subsidiaries. To see whether 
there is any difference in firm  performance according to they were master firms or 
subsidiaries, we estimated the following model: 
 
ln(πt+1/πt-1) = α + β0*ln(πt-1) + β1i(EMPt) + β2iINCLHQ + β3i SPLITED + 
β4iSPLITED*INCLHQ + β5iControls, 
 
where  
•  INCLHQ is a dummy variable indicating whether the company includes the former 
headquarters of the former state company.  
 
Because we were interested in the long run effects of occurent spontaneous 
restructuring of establishments, we ran the regression on the observations for the post-
privatization period. The regression results in Table 13 imply that former parent companies 
perform worse than subsidiary companies. 
To explore further the determinants that could affect decisions on boundary 
changes, we also examined the information on the business relationships of the splited 
partners. The results provided in Table 14 include probit estimations with the dummy 
MAST used as a dependent variable to see what kind of business relationships split-ups 
initiated by the managers of master firms more likely resulted in: whether the split partners   10
had a vertical relationship, became competitors of each other, or produced independent 
products. Logarithmic level of the current year performance variables were also included 
in the analysis, to see whether the splits tended to effect better or worse performing firms. 
Results show, that the two dummies for competitors and independent companies are 
statistically significant with negative marginal effects, suggesting that master firms were 
less likely to creat rivals for their own companies.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
  The definition of the firm and its boundaries is one of the fundamental issues in all 
of economics, as well as one of the most vexing and interesting in the economics of 
socialism and transition.  As emphasized in a number of studies of socialist economies 
(e.g., Kornai, 1992), the principal coordination mechanism in the classical “centrally 
managed” economies was bureaucratic - commands and negotiations - with little scope for 
markets or other coordinating devices.  The relationship of the branch minister to the 
director of a subordinated enterprise differed little from the relationship of the director to a 
worker in his/her factory:  both involved hierarchical giving and receiving of orders and 
continual bargaining over terms, timing, and quality.  Moreover, when one considers the 
multi-layered nature of economic organization, for instance the presence in the socialist 
economy of a variety of intermediate organs, such as trusts, kombinats, directorates and so 
forth, that grouped production establishments, it becomes even less clear how the 
“boundaries of  the firm” should be defined.  The sudden arrival of economic transition 
resulted in these somewhat arbitrary collections of assets – the state enterprises – suddenly 
forced with the necessity to re-organize.  At the same time, the insiders in these entities and 
in the ministries and other organs that had controlled them and the incentives and the 
ability, in the murky legal environment of the time, to re-organize according to their own 
interests. 
The confluence of these developments with changes in firm governance 
(privatization) thus provides an interesting setting for investigating the determinants of 
firm boundaries.  Our preliminary analysis has attempted to uncover differences in the 
patterns of split-ups in the pre-privatization compared to the post-privatization period.   
Some of the results provide some support for the notion that boundary changes were more 
likely to be value-enhancing after privatization than before.  Overall, however, the results 
are quite mixed, and further investigation is necessary before firm conclusions can be 
drawn. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of Firms by Branch 
 
 
Czech and Slovak 
Republics 
Hungary  Romania   All 
  N  %    N %    N %    N % 
Food  19  13.57   28  28.57    18 18.37  65 19.35
Light  industry  28  20.00   23  23.47    20 20.41  71 21.13
Heavy 
processing  
30 21.43   26 26.53    5  5.10   61  18.15
Machines 46  32.86    19  19.39    0  0.00   65  19.35
Construction  9 6.43    1 1.02    28 28.57  38 11.31
Services 4  2.86    0  0.00    27  27.55   31  9.23
Other 4  2.86    1  1.02    0  0.00   5  1.49
Total  140  100.00    98  100.00   98 100.00  336 100.00
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Table 2 
Total Employment in Legal Entity 
 
  Czech and Slovak 
Republics 
Hungary Romania  All 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N
1989 3,698.6 1,700.0 97 2,349.8 1,042.0 234 1,563.6 1,004.0 91 2,349.8 1,042.0 234
1990 2,601.3 1,454.0 103 1,650.1 882.0 263 1,214.7 872.5 92 1,650.1 882.0 263
1991 1,678.1 743.0 116 1,165.6 597.5 298 954.9 662.0 94 1,165.6 597.5 298
1992 1,087.1 551.5 126 865.5 492.0 313 800.6 533.0 97 865.5 492.0 313
1993 874.9 459.5 130 714.1 414.5 320 658.3 453.5 98 714.1 414.5 320
1994 743.9 421.0 131 631.6 400.5 322 595.5 465.5 98 631.6 400.5 322
1995 636.7 389.0 117 580.6 382.0 301 529.2 399.5 98 580.6 382.0 301
1996 695.8 383.5 86 560.6 326.0 262 489.8 363.0 85 560.6 326.0 262
1997 598.0 339.5 86 505.3 294.0 261 498.4 351.0 84 505.3 294.0 261
1998 521.0 309.0 85 460.3 262.5 260 489.0 335.5 84 460.3 262.5 260
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Table 3 
Total Employment at the Firm 
 
  Czech and Slovak Republics  Hungary  Romania 
Mean  Median Valid N Mean Median  Valid N Mean Median Valid N 
1989 1,286.5 807.0 107 1,037.9 754.0  79 1,623.9 500.0 51   
1990 1,159.5 723.0 115 917.1 677.0  83 1,175.0 405.0 81   
1991 885.3  552.0 129 781.5 600.0  89 941.6 401.5 90   
1992 792.5  490.0 138 670.2 503.0  95 815.3 402.0 91   
1993 702.8  440.0 139 610.1 443.0  98 730.6 342.0 91   
1994 663.7  400.0 134 566.8 434.0  98 615.8 296.5 98   
1995 671.5  380.0 116 475.5 385.0  84 530.8 290.0 91   
1996 695.8  383.5 86 489.8 363.0  85 499.1 246.0 91   
1997 612.3  344.0 84 498.4 351.0  84 424.1 190.0 91   
1998 533.6  342.0 83 489.0 335.5  84 377.0 156.0 91   
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Table 4 
Number of establishments  
 
 
  Czech and Slovak Republics  Hungary  Romania 
Mean  Median Valid N Mean Median  Valid N Mean Median Valid N 
1989 6.4  4.0 121 5.4 3.0  94   
1990 5.5  3.0 124 4.9 3.0  94  7.3 4.0 82   
1991 3.5  1.0 125 4.4 2.0  96   
1992 2.6  1.0 131 4.1 2.0  98   
1993 2.4  1.0 134 3.4 2.0  98   
1994 2.2  1.0 133 3.2 2.0  98   
1995 2.6  1.0 93 3.5 2.0  87 7.8 4.0 97 
1996 2.3  1.0 93 3.5 2.0  87 7.6 4.0 97 
1997 2.2  1.0 93 3.6 2.0  86 7.4 4.0 97 
1998 2.0  1.0 93 3.6 2.0  85 6.7 4.0 97 
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Table 5 
Number of employees per  establishment 
 
 
  Czech and Slovak Republics  Hungary  Romania 
  Mean Median  Valid  N  Mean Median  Valid  N  Mean Median  Valid  N 
1989 995.2  568.3 96 498.2 336.3  91  
1990 906.8  633.0 101 461.4 312.0  91 260.8 102.7 67   
1991 730.7  422.0 115 385.2 251.0  93    
1992 649.0  375.3 125 328.1 200.0  97    
1993 575.2  312.0 129 318.4 209.6  98    
1994 543.9  313.5 126 309.1 190.8  98    
1995 473.5  275.0 87 240.4 165.5  84 114.6 57.5 90   
1996 430.0  271.0 85 252.7 155.5  85 110.4 56.2 90   
1997 391.4  248.0 84 262.0 136.9  84 93.6 51.0 90   
1998 357.2  220.0 83 251.9 143.5  84 83.1 39.7 90   
   16
 
Table 6.a 
Occurrence of split-ups 
 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
  Czech and Slovak Republics 
split-ups 5  24 35 38 17 15  5  9  6  9 
N  120 128 127 131 131 132 131  92  92  92 
  Hungary 
split-ups 2  16 19 16 21 19  4  10  6  6 
N  92 92 95 97 98 98 87 87 85 85 
 Romania 
split-ups  1 4  27  11  5 3 2 4 5 5 
N  62 72 93 94 94 95 98 97 97 97 
 All 
split-ups 8  44 81 65 43 37 11 23 17 20 
N  274 292 315 322 323 325 316 276 274 274 
 
 
 
Table 6.b 
Occurrence of mergers 
 
 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
  Czech and Slovak Republics 
mergers 1 0 2 2 1 0 2 0 1 1 
N  120 128 127 131 131 132 131  92  92  92 
  Hungary 
mergers 0 0 3 3 0 5 3 7 9 8 
N  92 92 95 97 98 98 87 87 85 85 
  Romania 
mergers 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
N  62 72 93 94 94 95 98 97 97 97 
  All 
mergers 1 0 6 5 2 6 5 7  10  9 
N  274 292 315 322 323 325 316 276 274 274 
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Table 7 
 
Number of privatized companies by year 
 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Czech and Slovak  
Republics 
 1 5 24 90 95 109 112  114  114
Hungary 
 
3  8 17 36 63 85 96 97 97 97
Romania 
 
    13 97 47 79 0  9 2  9 4  
TOTAL  3  9  22 61 192 254 282 299 303 305
N  305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305
 
 
Table 8 
Split-ups and Mergers before and after Privatization 
 
  After Privatization   
  no yes total 
no  1248 1194 2442  Splited 
yes  231 96 327 
 total  1479 1290 2769 
 
  After Privatization   
  no yes total 
no  1467 1252 2719  Merged  
yes  12 38 50 
 total  1479 1290 2769 
 
 
   18
Table 9 
Splitups by Initiators 
 
 
Czech and Slovak Republics  
Who initiated the split-up? 
 Mother 
comp. 
Subsidiary State  Total   
no  14 6 12 32  28.6%
yes  38 16 26 80  71.4%
Total  52 22 38 84  100.0%
Does the firm include 
the headquarters of 
the legal 
predecessor?  
 46.4% 19.6% 33.9% 100.0%   
 
Hungary 
Who initiated the split-up? 
 Mother 
comp. 
Subsidiary State Total   
no  18 4 4   26  23.0 %
yes  60 5 22   87   77.0 %
Total  78 9 26 75    100.0%
Does the firm include 
the headquarters of 
the legal predecessor?  
 69.0% 8.0% 23.0%  100.0%   
 
Romania 
Who initiated the split-up? 
 Mother 
comp. 
Subsidiary State  Total   
no  11 3 5   12.2 %
yes  27 2 7 36  87.8 %
Total  28 3 10 41  100.0%
Does the firm include 
the headquarters of 
the legal 
predecessor?  
 68.3% 7.3% 24.4% 100.0%   
 
All 
Who initiated the split-up? 
 Mother 
comp. 
Subsidiary State  Total   
no  33 11 19 63  23.7 %
yes  125 23 55 203  76.3 %
Total  158 34 74 266  100.0%
Does the firm include 
the headquarters of 
the legal 
predecessor?  
 59.4% 12.8% 27.8% 100.0%   
 
   19
Table 10 
Pooled File: Does Privatization Make Difference? (OLS estimates) 
 
 
  ln change in 
revenues over 
employment 
ln change in  
value added over 
employment 
ln change in  
profit over 
employment 
ln change in  
profit over 
revenues 
ln change in 
investments over 
employment 
ln change in 
investments  
over revenues 
  coeff.  t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t 
ln lagged perf. var.  -0.282  -17.53 -0.412 -16.48 -0.439 -15.95 -0.501 -18.18 -0.449 -16.00 -0.542 -1.40 
ln employment  -0.280  -2.00 0.017 0.63 0.354 0.59  0.237 0.42 -0.046 -1.01 -0.084 -1.54 
splited (dummy)  -0.125  -2.41 -0.097 -1.04 0.150 0.59  0.019 0.09 -0.092 -0.52 0.238 1.05 
after privatization 
(dummy) 
0.136 3.19 0.265 3.48 0.566 3.01  0.464 2.66 -0.044 -0.31 -0.482 -3.19 
interaction of 
splited and after 
privatization 
0.066 0.73 0.013 0.08 0.363 0.84  0.280 0.74 0.384 1.35 -0.014 -0.04 
Hungary 0.574  13.17 0.759 10.36 0.792 4.77  0.146 0.97 0.620 5.84 0.076 0.58 
Romania -0.796  -14.82 -0.882 -10.07 -0.820 -4.23  0.660 3.12 -0.271 -7.97 0.106 0.59 
Constant 2.049  13.64 1.984 8.57 0.536 1.17  -1.427 -3.13 1.741 4.55 0.476 1.04 
R
2   0.254 0.301 0.515 0.522 0.229 0.017 
 N  1413 967  908 1012  1039 876 
Note: years and the following branch groups were controlled for: food, heavy, light, machine, construction, services, other.    20
Table 11 
Before and together with Privatization: Who Initiated the Splitup? (OLS estimates) 
 
 
  ln change in 
revenues over 
employment 
ln change in  
value added over 
employment 
ln change in  
profit over 
employment 
ln change in  
profit over 
revenues 
ln change in 
investments over 
employment 
ln change in 
investments 
 over revenues 
  coeff.  t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t coeff. t 
ln lagged perf. var.  -0.149  -1.66 -0.567 -7.15 -0.613 -2.80  -0.516 -2.25 -0.372 -2.14 -1.158 -0.35 
ln employment  0.120  1.43 0.180 1.80 0.343 1.24  0.013 0.05 -0.009 -0.04 -0.157 -0.47 
initiated by 
subsidiary (dummy) 
-0.382 -1.73 -0.277 -0.95 0.212 0.25  -0.010 -0.01 -0.295 -0.47 0.517 0.67 
initiated by state 
(dummy) 
0.044 0.27 -0.016 -0.09 -0.176 -0.34  -0.163 -0.36 -0.862 -2.03 -1.26 -2.57 
Hungary 0.314  1.38 0.966 3.87 0.953 1.34  -0.117 -0.21 0.356 0.72 0.046 0.06 
Romania -0.692  -2.03 -1.143 -3.10 1.904 1.23  2.606 1.40 -1.836 -1.64 -0.116 -0.10 
Constant 0.657  0.59 2.14 2.58 0.141 0.08  -2.206 -1.00 2.168 1.28 2.29 0.89 
R
2   0.182 0.561 0.404 0.223 0.179 0.200 
 N  86 63 46 49 65 47 
Note: years and the following branch groups were controlled for: food, heavy, light, machine, construction, services, other.  
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Table 12 
After Privatization: Effects of Splitups according to Ownership Type (OLS estimates) 
 
  ln change in 
revenues over 
employment 
ln change in  
value added over 
employment 
ln change in  
profit over 
employment 
ln change in  
profit over 
revenues 
ln change in 
investments  
over employment 
  coeff. t coeff. t coeff.  t coeff. t coeff. t 
ln lagged perf. var.  -0.217 -9.13 -0.317 -9.16 -0.666  -19.06 -0.736 -21.28 -0.485 -12.03
ln employment  -0.014 -0.73 0.018 0.59 -0.004  -0.06 0.059 0.92 0.001 0.01
worker own  0.023 0.26 0.099 0.74 0.464  1.35 0.290 0.93 0.438 1.39
manager own  0.002 0.03 0.200 1.62 0.763  2.33 0.548 1.87 0.281 0.93
collective own  0.102 1.32 0.232 1.97 0.631  1.99 0.309 1.09 0.486 1.73
foreigner own  0.224 2.74 0.285 2.26 0.837  2.42 0.286 0.95 0.608 2.04
domestic own  0.033 0.40 0.206 1.63 0.343  0.99 0.101 0.34 0.302 1.02
splited (dummy)  -0.005 -0.03 -0.138 -0.40 0.380  0.40 -0.578 -0.93 0.865 1.23
splited*worker 0.117 0.26 -0.450  -0.40 0.398 0.47 -1.725 -1.42
splited*manager -0.069 -0.27 -0.054 0.13 -1.267  -1.08 -0.882 -0.97
splited*collective 0.027 0.08   -0.315 -0.30
splited*foreigner 0.023 0.10 0.171 0.42 0.333  0.31 1.195 1.52 -0.388 -0.47
splited*domestic -0.085 -0.36 -0.360 -0.09 -0.093  -0.08 0.426 0.51 -1.181 -1.43
Hungary 0.366 5.00 0.553 4.97 1.463  5.64 0.411 1.87 0.441 2.14
Romania -0.569 -5.90 -0.648 -4.50 -0.911  -2.80 0.661 2.32 -1.539 -4.99
Constant 1.567 7.11 1.49 4.72 1.758  2.79 -3.331 -5.96 2.108 3.74
R
2   0.164 0.165 0.520 0.556 0.226 
 N  589 461 409 424 498 
Note: years and the following branch groups were controlled for: food, heavy, light, machine, construction, services, other.    22
Table 13 
After Privatization: Effect of Mergers according to Ownership Type (OLS estimates) 
 
  ln change in 
revenues over 
employment 
ln change in  
value added over 
employment 
ln change in  
profit over 
employment 
ln change in  
profit over 
revenues 
ln change in 
investments  
over employment 
  coeff. t coeff. t coeff.  t coeff. t coeff. t 
ln lagged perf. var.  -0.217 -9.16 -0.317 -9.14 -0.664  -18.95 -0.737 -21.22 -0.487 -11.94
ln employment  -0.017 -0.86 0.012 0.39 0.003  0.05 0.059 0.92 0.005 0.07
worker own  0.026 0.30 0.095 0.72 0.456  1.33 0.269 0.86 0.433 1.37
manager own  -0.007 -0.09 0.182 1.50 0.715  2.18 0.514 1.76 0.277 0.94
collective own  0.112 1.43 0.231 1.96 0.641  2.01 0.288 1.01 0.544 1.93
foreigner own  0.225 2.77 0.286 2.29 0.896  2.59 0.331 1.09 0.679 2.29
domestic own  0.015 0.19 0.182 1.44 0.352  1.01 0.100 0.33 0.249 0.83
splited (dummy)  -0.251 -0.98 -0.104 -0.30 -0.347  -0.36 -0.011 -0.01 -410 -0.50
splited*worker  
splited*manager 0.314 0.63 -0.196 -0.03 0.286  0.17 0.110 0.07 0.790 0.49
splited*collective  
splited*foreigner 0.234 0.77 0.185 0.43 0.641  0.57 0.363 0.36 0.172 0.17
splited*domestic 0.377 1.24 0.303 0.71 0.380  0.33 -0.032 -0.03 0.749 0.76
Hungary 0.362 4.89 0.542 4.82 1.445  5.46 0.40 1.80 0.428 2.02
Romania -0.579 -5.98 -0.649 -4.48 -0.922  -2.81 0.666 2.32 -1.567 -5.01
Constant 1.587 7.21 1.515 4.76 1.731  2.72 -3.353 -5.96 2.127 3.75
R
2   0.167 0.166 0.517 0.553 0.223 
 N  589 461 409 424 498 
Note: years and the following branch groups were controlled for: food, heavy, light, machine, construction, services, other.    23
Table 14 
Pooled file: former headquarters 
 
 
  ln change in 
revenues over 
employment 
ln change in  
value added over 
employment 
ln change in  
profit over 
employment 
ln change in  
profit over 
revenues 
ln change in 
investments over 
employment 
  coeff. t coeff. t coeff.  t coeff. t coeff. t 
ln lagged perf. var.  -0.219 -8.06 -0.330 -8.88 -0.593  -13.09 -0.690 -15.63 -0.473 -11.39
ln employment  -0.005 -0.23 0.030 0.87 0.001  0.01 0.094 1.21 0.003 0.04
splited (dummy)  -0.194 -0.73 -0.598 0.87 -1.772  -1.79 -1.262 -1.41 -0.197 -0.07
former headquarters 
(dummy) 
-0.914 -1.81 -0.167 -1.41 -0.459 -2.39 -0.511 -3.08 0.220 1.33
interaction of 
splited*headquarters 
0.187 0.67 0.527 1.19 2.175 2.06 1.457 1.53
private shares  0.002 1.72 0.004 2.38 0.0122  2.68 0.008 2.20 0.006 1.76
Hungary 0.473 6.00 0.687 6.07 1.657  6.12 0.613 2.75 0.707 3.70
Romania -0.531 -5.90 -0.636 -4.91 -0.697  -2.37 0.805 2.95 -1.546 -5.64
Constant 1.452 4.63 1.103 2.28 0.486  0.45 -4.034 -4.14 3.567 2.27
R
2
  0.141 0.219 0.473 0.513 0.237 
  N  488 385 324 343 420 
Note: years and the following branch groups were controlled for: food, heavy, light, machine, construction, services, other.  
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Probit Regression Results  
Before and together with Privatization:  
The management of the master company as initiator and the business relationship of the splited companies 
 
 
Initiator:  
management of 
mother com. 
Initiator:  
management of 
mother com. 
Initiator:  
management of 
mother com 
Initiator:  
management of 
mother com 
marg. 
effect
t marg. 
effect
t marg. 
effect
tm a r g .  
effect
t
ln employment  -0.015 -0.23 -0.270 -0.34  0.031 0.38 0.032 0.39
ln perf. var.  0.175 2.33 -0.002 -0.03  0.007 0.17 0.126 2.59
competitor (dummy) -0.417 -2.38 -0.592 -2.68  -0.737 -2.90 -0.479 -2.01
independent comp. 
(dummy) 
-0.324 -1.83 -0.426 -1.78 -0.644 -2.47 -0.356 -1.53
Hungary -0.039 -0.33 -0.07 -0.53  0.022 0.15 -0.058 -0.38
Romania 0.717 2.18 -0.226 -0.40  0.114 0.52 0.557 1.87
R
2
  130 93  92  95 
  N  0.197 0.177 0.209 0.276 
Note: years and the following branch groups were controlled for: food, heavy, light, machine, construction, services, other.  
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